


EBOLA SITUATION REPORT

2 DECEMBER 2015



SUMMARY

- No confirmed cases were reported in the week to 29 November. Investigations are ongoing into the origin of infection of the cluster of 3 confirmed cases of Ebola virus disease (EVD) reported from Liberia in the week to 22 November. The first-reported case in that cluster was a 15-year-old boy who tested positive for EVD after admission to a health facility in the Greater Monrovia area on 19 November. He was then transferred to an Ebola treatment centre along with the 5 other members of his family. Two other members of the family the boy's 8-year old brother and his 40-year-old father subsequently tested positive for EVD whilst in isolation. The 15-year-old boy died on 23 November. In addition to the family of the first-reported case, 165 contacts have been identified so far, including 34 high-risk contacts. Liberia was previously declared free of Ebola transmission on 3 September 2015.
- On 7 November WHO declared that Sierra Leone had achieved objective 1 of the phase 3 framework, and the country has now entered a 90-day period of enhanced surveillance scheduled to conclude on 5 February 2016. As of 29 November it had been 13 days since the last EVD patient in Guinea received a second consecutive EVD-negative blood test. The last case in Guinea was reported on 29 October 2015.
- The recent cases in Liberia underscore the importance of robust surveillance measures to ensure the rapid detection of any reintroduction or re-emergence of EVD in currently unaffected areas. In order to achieve objective 2 of the phase 3 response framework to manage and respond to the consequences of residual Ebola risks Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have each put surveillance systems in place to enable health workers and members of the public to report any case of illness or death that they suspect may be related to EVD to the relevant authorities. In the week to 29 November, 18 014 such alerts were reported in Guinea, with alerts reported from all of the country's 34 prefectures. Equivalent data are not currently available for Liberia. In Sierra Leone, 1420 alerts were reported from all 14 districts in the week ending 15 November (the most recent week for which data are available).
- As part of each country's EVD surveillance strategy, blood samples or oral swabs should be collected from any live or deceased individuals who have or had clinical symptoms compatible with EVD. In the week to 29 November, 8 operational laboratories in Guinea tested a total of 631 new and repeat samples from 15 of the country's 34 prefectures. 82% of all samples tested in Guinea were swabs collected from dead bodies. By contrast, 84% of the 981 new and repeat samples tested in Liberia over the same period were blood samples collected from live patients. In addition, all 15 counties in Liberia submitted samples for testing by the country's 5 operational laboratories. 1344 new samples were collected from all 14 districts in Sierra Leone and tested by 8 operational laboratories. 89% of samples in Sierra Leone were swabs collected from dead bodies.
- 994 deaths in the community were reported from Guinea in the week to 29 November through the country's alerts system. This represents approximately 44% of the 2248 community deaths expected based on estimates of the population and a crude mortality rate of 11 deaths per 1000 people per year. Equivalent data are not yet available for Liberia. In Sierra Leone, 1282 reports of community deaths were received through the alert system during the week ending 15 November (the most recent week for which data are available), representing approximately 62% of the 2075 deaths expected each week based on estimates of the population and a crude mortality rate of 17 deaths per 1000 people per year.

Figure 1: Confirmed, probable, and suspected EVD cases worldwide (data up to 29 November 2015)




Table 1: Confirmed, probable, and suspected cases in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone

| Country | Case definition | Cumulative cases | Cases in past 21 days | Cumulative deaths | |
|---------------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--|
| | Confirmed | 3351 | 0 | 2083 | |
| Guinea | Probable | 453 | * | 453 | |
| | Suspected | 0 | * | ‡ | |
| | Total | 3804 | 0 | 2536 | |
| | Confirmed | 3151 | - | ‡ | |
| | Probable | 1879 | - | ‡ | |
| | Suspected | 5636 | - | ‡ | |
| Liberia** | Total | 10 666 | - | 4806 | |
| Liberia | Confirmed | 9 | 3 | 3 | |
| | Probable | * | * | ‡ | |
| | Suspected | ‡ | * | ‡ | |
| | Total | 9 | 3 | 3 | |
| | Confirmed | 8704 | 0 | 3589 | |
| Siama Laana† | Probable | 287 | * | 208 | |
| Sierra Leone [†] | Suspected | 5131 | * | 158 | |
| | Total | 14 122 | 0 | 3955 | |
| Total | Confirmed | 15 215 | 3 | ‡ | |
| | Probable | 2619 | * | ‡ | |
| IUlai | Suspected | 10 767 | * | ‡ | |
| | Total | 28 601 | 3 | 11 300 | |

Data are based on official information reported by ministries of health. These numbers are subject to change due to ongoing reclassification, retrospective investigation and availability of laboratory results. *Not reported due to the high proportion of probable and suspected cases that are reclassified. [‡]Data not available. **Cases reported before 9 May 2015 are shaded blue. Due to ongoing surveillance and retrospective validation of cases and deaths, these totals may be subject to revision. [†]Sierra Leone was declared free of Ebola virus transmission in the human population on 7 November 2015, and has now entered a 90-day period of heightened surveillance.

PHASE 3 RESPONSE FRAMEWORK

28 601 confirmed, probable, and suspected cases have been reported in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, with 11 300 deaths (table 1; figure 2) since the onset of the Ebola outbreak. The majority of these cases and deaths were reported between August and December 2014, after which case incidence began to decline as a result of the rapid scale-up of treatment, isolation, and safe burial capacity in the three countries. This rapid scale-up operation was known as phase 1 of the response, and was built on in the first half of 2015 during a period of continuous refinement to surveillance, contact tracing, and community engagement interventions. This period, termed phase 2, succeeded in driving case incidence to 5 cases or fewer per week by the end of July. This marked fall in case incidence signalled a transition to a distinct third phase of the epidemic, characterised by limited transmission across small geographical areas, combined with a low probability of high consequence incidents of re-emergence of EVD from reservoirs of viral persistence. In order to effectively interrupt remaining transmission chains and manage the residual risks posed by viral persistence, WHO, as lead agency within the Interagency Collaboration on Ebola and in coordination with national and international partners, designed the phase 3 Ebola response framework. The phase 3 response framework builds on the foundations of phase 1 and phase 2 to incorporate new developments in Ebola control, from vaccines and rapid-response teams to counselling and welfare services for survivors. The indicators below detail progress made towards attaining the two primary objectives of the phase 3 framework.

OBJECTIVE 1: RAPIDLY INTERRUPT ALL REMAINING CHAINS OF EBOLA TRANSMISSION

- As of 7 November objective 1 of the phase 3 response framework was achieved in Sierra Leone.
- As of 29 November it had been 13 days since the last EVD patient in Guinea received a second consecutive EVD-negative blood test. High priority performance indicators for objective 1 of the phase 3 response framework in Guinea are shown in table 4.
- The Ebola ça suffit! ring vaccination trial is continuing in Guinea and Sierra Leone, and has now been extended to Liberia following the country's recent cluster of cases. All rings comprised of contacts and contacts of contacts associated with confirmed cases now receive immediate vaccination with the rVSV-ZEBOV Ebola vaccine. On 1 September, the eligibility criteria for the trial were amended to allow the vaccination of children aged 6 years and above.
- Key performance indicators for objective 1 of the phase 3 response framework in Liberia are shown in table 5. Investigations are ongoing into the origin of infection of the cluster of 3 confirmed EVD cases reported from Liberia in the week to 22 November. The first-reported case in that cluster was a 15-year-old boy who tested positive for EVD after admission to a health facility in the Greater Monrovia area on 19 November. He was then transferred to an Ebola treatment centre along with the 5 other members of his family. Two other members of the family the boy's 8-year old brother and his 40-year-old father subsequently tested positive for EVD whilst in isolation. The 15-year-old died on 23 November.
- In addition to the immediate family of the first-reported case, 165 contacts have been identified so far (table 2), including 34 high-risk contacts.

Table 2: Cases and contacts by prefecture/county over the past 3 weeks

| Country Prefecture Country County | Prefecture/ | Week | | 23 Nov | 24 Nov | 25 Nov | 26 Nov | 27 Nov | 28 Nov | 29 Nov | Week 48 | Contacts under follow |
|-----------------------------------|-------------|------|----|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------|--------------------------|
| | County | 46 | 47 | | | | | | | | | up* |
| Guinea | Forecariah | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Subtotal | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Liberia | Montserrado | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 165 |
| Subtotal | | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 165 |
| Total | | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 165 |


Data are based on official information reported by ministries of health. These numbers are subject to change due to ongoing reclassification, retrospective investigation, and availability of laboratory results. *Data as of 29 November 2015.

Table 3: Location and epidemiological status of confirmed cases reported in the 3 weeks to 29 November 2015

| Country | Prefecture/ County | Sub- prefecture/ District | Week 46 (9 - 15 Nov 2015) | Week 47 (16 - 22 Nov 2015) | Cases | Week 48 On contact list | (23 - 29 N Epi- link* | November 2019 Unknown source of infection [‡] | 5) Confirmed community death [§] | Date of last confirmed case |
|----------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|--|--|-----------------------------------|
| Guinea | Forecariah | Kaliah | 0 | 0 | | | | | | 29/10/2015 |
| Subtotal | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Liberia | Montserrado | Greater Monrovia | 0 | 3 | | | | | | 20/11/2015 |
| Subtotal | | | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Total | | | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |


^{*}Epi-link refers to cases who were not registered as contacts of a previous case (possibly because they refused to cooperate or were untraceable), but who, after further epidemiological investigation, were found to have had contact with a previous case, OR refers to cases who are resident or are from a community with active transmission in the past 21 days. [‡]Includes cases under epidemiological investigation. [§]A case that is identified as a community death can also be registered as a contact, or subsequently be found to have had contact with a known case (epi-link), or have no known link to a previous case.

Table 4: Key performance indicators for phase 3 objective 1 in Guinea



 $For \ definitions \ of \ key \ performance \ indicators \ see \ Annex \ 1. \ Week \ 39 \ commenced \ 21 \ September. \ Week \ 48 \ ended \ 29 \ November.$

Table 5: Key performance indicators for phase 3 objective 1 in Liberia



For definitions of key performance indicators see Annex 1. Week 39 commenced 21 September. Week 48 ended 29 November.





Figure 2: Geographical distribution of new and total confirmed cases in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted and dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.

Figure 3: Confirmed weekly Ebola virus disease cases reported nationally and by prefecture from Guinea

Data source Patient Database Situation Report

Fig. 100




OBJECTIVE 2: MANAGE AND RESPOND TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF RESIDUAL EBOLA RISKS

- Key performance indicators for the surveillance component of objective 2 of the phase 3 response framework are shown for Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (table 6). Data for phase 3 indicators pertaining to service provision for survivors and rapid response capacity (annex 1 and annex 2) are being collected and will be included in subsequent situation reports.
- The recent cases in Liberia underscore the importance of robust surveillance measures to ensure the rapid detection of any reintroduction or re-emergence of EVD in currently unaffected areas. In order to achieve objective 2 of the phase 3 response framework to manage and respond to the consequences of residual Ebola risks Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have each put surveillance systems in place to enable health workers and members of the public to report any case of febrile illness or death that they suspect may be related to EVD to the relevant authorities. In the week to 29 November, 18 014 such alerts were reported in Guinea, with alerts reported from all of the country's 34 prefectures. Equivalent data are not currently available for Liberia. In Sierra Leone, 1420 alerts were reported from all 14 districts in the week ending 15 November (the most recent week for which data are available; table 6).
- As part of each country's EVD surveillance strategy, blood samples or oral swabs should be collected from any live or deceased individuals who have or had clinical symptoms compatible with EVD. In the week to 29 November, 9 operational laboratories in Guinea tested a total of 631 new and repeat samples from 15 of the country's 34 prefectures (table 6). This represents a small decrease compared with the previous week, though the trend in the number of samples tested each week has remained flat for the past two months. 82% of all samples tested in Guinea were swabs collected from dead bodies. By contrast, 84% of the 981 new and repeat samples tested in Liberia over the same period were blood samples collected from live patients. This is the third consecutive weekly increase in samples tested for EVD. In addition, all 15 counties in Liberia submitted samples for testing by the country's 5 operational laboratories. 1344 new samples were collected from all 14 districts in Sierra Leone and tested by 8 operational laboratories. This is a marginal decrease compared with the previous week. 89% of samples in Sierra Leone were swabs collected from dead bodies (table 6).
- 994 deaths in the community were reported from Guinea in the week to 29 November through the country's alerts system (table 6). This represents approximately 44% of the 2248 community deaths expected based on estimates of the population and a crude mortality rate of 11 deaths per 1000 people per year. Equivalent data are not yet available for Liberia. In Sierra Leone, 1282 reports of community deaths were received through the alert system during the week ending 15 November (the most recent week for which data are available), representing approximately 62% of the 2075 deaths expected each week based on estimates of the population and a crude mortality rate of 17 deaths per 1000 people per year.
- Figures 4 and 5 show the locations of operational laboratories in each of the three countries, along with the geographic distribution of blood samples taken from live patients with symptoms compatible with EVD, and of oral swabs taken collected from dead bodies. In both Guinea and Sierra Leone the majority of samples tested in the week to 29 November were oral swabs collected from dead bodies (82% and 89%, respectively). By contrast, 84% of samples tested in Liberia were blood samples collected from live patients.
- The deployment of rapid-response teams to quickly limit the transmission of Ebola virus following the detection of a new chain of transmission was and continues to be a cornerstone of the national response strategy in Sierra Leone. Between 14 and 28 November a series of simulation exercises took place to validate national and international rapid-response capacities in the event of detection of a new case of EVD.
- The unprecedented scale of the EVD outbreak in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone means there are estimated to be several thousands of survivors throughout the three countries. Survivors have contributed enormously to many aspects of response, but they face many challenges. In addition to the stigmatization they frequently experience when they return to their own communities, survivors also face myriad health issues, from joint pains and headaches to problems with vision and poor mental health. Although there is a vibrant self-organised survivor-support community, survivors require specialized medical support as well as access to

routine health care services such as ante-natal care and vaccinations and screening. With guidance from WHO and other partners, ministries of health in the three most-affected countries have plans in place to deliver a comprehensive package of services to ensure the welfare of survivors and mitigate risks posed by viral persistence.

Table 6: Key surveillance indicators for phase 3 objective 2 in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone



 $For \ definitions \ of \ key \ performance \ indicators \ see \ Annex \ 1. \ Week \ 39 \ commenced \ 21 \ September. \ Week \ 48 \ ended \ 29 \ November.$




Figure 4: Location of laboratories and geographical distribution of samples from live patients in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone in the week to 29 November 2015

The analysis includes initial and repeat samples but excludes samples with unknown and incorrect testing weeks and samples with unknown or incorrect location information. EDPLN=Emerging and Dangerous Pathogens Laboratory Network. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted and dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement. 2=CREMS Lab – Kindia; 5=EU Mobile Lab – Coyah; 8=K-Plan Mobile Lab – Forecariah; 9=IP Dakar – Conakry; 12=REDC Lab – Conakry; 14=K-Plan Mobile Lab – Conakry; 15=Boke Mobile Lab; 17=Tappita Lab – Nimba; 23=LIBR National Reference Lab/USAMRIID; 26=OIC-NMRC Mobile Lab Bong; 27=MOH Lab – Montserrado; 28= Redemption Hospital Lab – Monsterrado; 29=China-CDC Lab – Jui; 32=CPHRL/DTRA – Western Area Urban; 33=EMDF/NICD – Western Area Urban; 37=MOH/Emergency – PCMH/Freetown; 39=Nigeria Mobile Lab – Kambia; 43=PH England Mobile Lab – Port Loko; 44=PH England Mobile Lab – Makeni; 45=PH England Mobile Lab – Kenema.




Figure 5: Location of laboratories and geographical distribution of samples from dead bodies in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone in the week to 29 November 2015

The analysis includes initial and repeat samples but excludes samples with unknown and incorrect testing weeks and samples with unknown or incorrect location information. EDPLN=Emerging and Dangerous Pathogens Laboratory Network. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted and dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement. 2=CREMS Lab – Kindia; 5=EU Mobile Lab – Coyah; 8=K-Plan Mobile Lab – Forecariah; 9=IP Dakar – Conakry; 12=REDC Lab – Conakry; 14=K-Plan Mobile Lab – Conakry; 15=Boke Mobile Lab; 17=Tappita Lab – Nimba; 23=LIBR National Reference Lab/USAMRIID; 26=OIC-NMRC Mobile Lab Bong; 27=MOH Lab – Montserrado; 28= Redemption Hospital Lab – Monsterrado; 29=China-CDC Lab – Jui; 32=CPHRL/DTRA – Western Area Urban; 33=EMDF/NICD – Western Area Urban; 37=MOH/Emergency – PCMH/Freetown; 39=Nigeria Mobile Lab – Kambia; 43=PH England Mobile Lab – Port Loko; 44=PH England Mobile Lab – Makeni; 45=PH England Mobile Lab – Kenema.




Figure 6: Time since last confirmed case in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted and dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.

PREVIOUSLY AFFECTED COUNTRIES

• Seven countries (Italy, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America) have previously reported a case or cases imported from a country with widespread and intense transmission.

PREPAREDNESS OF COUNTRIES TO RAPIDLY DETECT AND RESPOND TO AN EBOLA EXPOSURE

- The introduction of an EVD case into unaffected countries remains a risk as long as cases exist in any country. With adequate preparation, however, such an introduction can be contained through a timely and effective response.
- WHO's preparedness activities aim to ensure all countries are ready to effectively and safely detect, investigate, and report potential EVD cases, and to mount an effective response. WHO provides this support through country support visits by preparedness-strengthening teams (PSTs) to help identify and prioritize gaps and needs, direct technical assistance, and provide technical guidance and tools.

Priority countries in Africa

- The initial focus of support by WHO and partners is on highest priority countries Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Senegal—followed by high priority countries—Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, South Sudan, and Togo. The criteria used to prioritize countries include the geographical proximity to affected countries, the magnitude of trade and migration links, and the relative strength of their health systems.
- Since October 2014, technical support has been provided Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, South Sudan, and Togo through team missions and targeted technical support. Technical working group meetings, field visits, high-level table-top exercises, and field simulations have helped to identify key areas for improvement. Each country has a tailored plan to strengthen operational readiness.
- From October 2014 to November 2015, WHO has undertaken over 336 field deployments to priority countries to assist with the implementation of national plans.
- WHO provides personal protective equipment (PPE) modules containing minimum stocks to cover staff protection and other equipment needs to support 10 patient-beds for 10 days for all staff with essential functions. PPE modules have been delivered to all countries on the African continent. In addition, all countries have received a PPE training module.
- Contingency stockpiles of PPE are in place in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depots (UNHRD) in Accra and Dubai, and are available to any country in the event that they experience a shortage.

Ongoing follow-up support to priority countries

- Following initial PST assessment missions to the priority countries in 2014, a second phase of preparedness-strengthening activities have provided support on a country-by-country basis.
- Technical support is provided at the request of the respective ministries of health to strengthen EVD preparedness by operationalizing plans, testing systems, building capacity, and providing technical guidance.

EVD preparedness officers

Dedicated EVD preparedness officers have been deployed to support the implementation of country preparedness plans, coordinate partners, provide a focal point for inter-agency collaboration, offer specific technical support in their respective areas of expertise, and develop capacity of national WHO staff. Preparedness officers are currently deployed to Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.

Training, exercises, and simulations

- Priority countries that have achieved a minimum of 50% implementation of preparedness checklist activities
 are encouraged to undertake a series of drills on elements of an EVD response and a functional exercise to test
 the coordination of the Ebola operations centre.
- In Mauritania, with support from WHO, national and regional rapid-response team training took place from 22 to 27 November. From 30 November to 4 December 2015, WHO is supporting the Ministry of Health with a simulation exercise, focusing on the coordination and operations of an Ebola treatment centre.
- In Togo, rapid-response training for national and regional teams is taking place from 30 November to 5 December.
- In Niger, from 5 to 12 December WHO is supporting the Ministry of Health with an exercise to simulate the coordination and operations of an Ebola treatment centre.
- In Gambia, a country-capacity assessment to review the range of capacities available for the management of emergencies took place from 23 to 27 November. The outcome of the assessment is a roadmap for the development of additional capacities for high-risk events.

Surveillance and preparedness indicators

- Indicators based on surveillance data, case management capacity, laboratory testing, and equipment stocks continue to be collected on a weekly basis from the four countries that share a border with affected countries: Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Senegal.
- An interactive preparedness dashboard based on the WHO EVD checklist¹ is available online.

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¹ See: http://who.int/csr/resources/publications/ebola/ebola-preparedness-checklist/en/

ANNEX 1: EBOLA RESPONSE PHASE 3 KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

| Indicator | Target | Numerator | Denominator | | | | | |
|---|------------------|--|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| OBJECTIVE 1: Interrupt all chains of transmission | | | | | | | | |
| Number of confirmed cases | 0 | # of new confirmed cases | N/A | | | | | |
| Number of confirmed deaths and proportion that occurred in the community | 0 | # of total new confirmed deaths # of new community deaths with positive EVD swab results | N/A | | | | | |
| Percentage of new cases from registered contacts | 100% | # of new confirmed cases registered as a contact | # of new confirmed cases | | | | | |
| OBJECTIVE 2: Prevent/Survivors | | | | | | | | |
| Number and percentage of registered survivors | N/A 100% | # of registered survivors | # of survivors estimated | | | | | |
| Percentage of registered survivors accessing basic service package | 100% | # of registered survivors accessing basic service package | # of registered survivors | | | | | |
| Number of male survivors' semen tested and the percentage positive | N/A 0% | # of male survivors' semen tested positive for EVD | # of male survivors' semen tested for EVD | | | | | |
| OBJECTIVE 2: Detect/Surveillance | | | | | | | | |
| Number of alerts | N/A | # of alerts | N/A | | | | | |
| Number of samples tested (samples from live and dead suspects) | N/A | # of samples tested for EVD (samples from live and dead suspects) | N/A | | | | | |
| OBJECTIVE 2: Respond/Rapid response tea | ms | | | | | | | |
| Number of functional national and/or sub-national rapid response teams | 3 per country | # of national rapid response teams appropriately staffed, equipped, and budgeted | N/A | | | | | |
| Time between confirmation of an event and deployment of rapid response team | | # of days between confirmation of an event and deployment of the team | N/A | | | | | |

ANNEX 2: ALL EBOLA RESPONSE PHASE 3 KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

| Indicator | Numerator | Denominator |
|--|--|--|
| OBJECTIVE 2: Prevent/Survivors | | |
| Essentials services for survivors agreed | Essentials services for survivors agreed (yes/no) | N/A |
| Agency-specific responsibilities for survivors agreed | Agency-specific responsibilities for survivors | N/A |
| under overall ECM/RC coordination | agreed (yes/no) | |
| Number and percentage of registered survivors | # of registered survivors | # of survivors estimated |
| compared to estimated number of survivors Percentage of registered survivors accessing basic | # of registered survivors accessing basic service | # of registered survivors |
| service package | package | # Of registered survivors |
| Number of laboratories with capacity for testing | # of laboratories with capacity for testing semen | N/A |
| semen for EVD | for EVD | |
| Counselling services, logistic capacity, and procedures in place to ship samples to appropriate | Counselling services, logistic capacity, and procedures in place to ship samples to | N/A |
| laboratory and provide feedback | appropriate laboratory and provide feedback | |
| , , | (yes/no) | |
| Number of male survivors' semen tested and the | # of male survivors' semen tested positive for | # of male survivors' semen |
| percentage positive | EVD | tested for EVD |
| Number of primary healthcare facilities providing essential services for survivors, and their locations | # of primary healthcare facilities providing essential services for survivors | N/A |
| Number of referral healthcare facilities for survivors, | # of referral healthcare facilities for survivors | N/A |
| and their locations | | |
| Coordination mechanism with WASH partners in | Coordination mechanism with WASH partners in | N/A |
| place OBJECTIVE 2: Detect/Surveillance | place (yes/no) | |
| | | |
| Number of alerts | # of alerts | N/A |
| Percentage of prefectures/ counties/ districts reporting alerts | # of prefectures/ counties/ districts reporting alerts | Total # of prefectures/ counties/ districts |
| Percentage of live alerts tested for EVD | # of live alerts tested for EVD | # of reported live patients |
| referringe of five alerts tested for LVD | # Of five dierts tested for EVD | meeting criteria for EVD |
| | | testing |
| Percentage of expected community deaths that were | # of reported community deaths (Sierra Leone: # | # of expected community |
| reported | of reported burial alerts) | deaths (= crude mortality * |
| Percentage of reported community deaths that were | # of community deaths that were swabbed for | population) # of reported community |
| swabbed and those which were EVD positive | EVD (Liberia and Sierra Leone: # of EVD swabs) | deaths (Sierra Leone: # of |
| | # of new community deaths with positive EVD | reported burial alerts) |
| | swab results | |
| Number of samples tested (samples from live and dead suspects) | # of samples tested for EVD (samples from live and dead suspects) | N/A |
| Percentage of prefectures/ counties/ districts | # of prefectures/ counties/ districts providing | Total # of prefectures/ |
| providing samples for EVD testing | samples for EVD testing | counties/ districts |
| Number of unsafe burials | # of burials that were reported to be unsafe | N/A |
| Number of prefectures/ counties/ districts with at | # of prefectures/ counties/ districts with at least | N/A |
| least one security incident or other form of refusal to cooperate | one security incident or other form of refusal to cooperate in the past week | |
| OBJECTIVE 2: Respond/Rapid response teams | cooperate in the past week | |
| Number of functional national and/or sub-national | # of national and/or sub-national rapid response | N/A |
| rapid response teams | teams appropriately staffed, equipped, and | .,, |
| | budgeted | |
| Time between confirmation of an event and | # of days between confirmation of an event and | N/A |
| deployment of rapid response team Number of generations of cases and secondary cases | deployment of the team # of generations of cases and secondary cases | N/A |
| after identification of a new index case | after identification of a new index case | |
| Number and percentage of prefectures/ counties/ | # of prefectures/ counties/ districts with | Total # of prefectures/ |
| districts with isolation capacity or referral plan of | isolation capacity or referral plan of suspect | counties/ districts |
| suspect cases | t of national simulations eversions conducted | NI/A |
| Number of national simulations exercises conducted | # of national simulations exercises conducted | N/A |
| Number of functional international rapid response support teams on stand-by | # of international rapid response support teams on stand-by which are appropriately staffed | N/A |
| Tappart touring of other by | trained, equipped, and budgeted | |
| Time between request for international response | # of days between request for international | N/A |
| and deployment of international rapid response | response and deployment of international rapid | |
| support team(s) Number of international simulation exercises | response support team(s) # of international simulation exercises | N/A |
| conducted | conducted | IV/A |
| COMMUNICIEU | conducted | |